Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy
Volume 4
Issue 1 Festschrift II in Honor of Julian Conrad
Juergensmeyer on the Occasion of His
Retirement: International Perspectives on Urban
Law & Policy

Article 22

2020

Why Greenland is not for Sale
Ellen Margrethe Basse
Aarhus University, Denmark, em@basse.dk

Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/jculp
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Land Use Law
Commons, and the Urban Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Basse, Ellen Margrethe (2020) "Why Greenland is not for Sale," Journal of Comparative Urban Law and
Policy: Vol. 4 : Iss. 1 , Article 22, 327-352.
Available at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/jculp/vol4/iss1/22

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy by an authorized editor of Reading Room. For more information,
please contact gfowke@gsu.edu.

Basse: Why Greenland is not for Sale

WHY GREENLAND IS NOT FOR SALE
Ellen Margrethe Basse*

1. INTRODUCTION
Through the last 26 years Julian C. Juergensmeyer and I have cooperated
on teaching and research in American and European/Danish environmental
regulation of growth management. This chapter is partly inspired by these
activities, partly by United States’ (hereinafter the U.S.) interests in the Danish
Arctic areas as these interests were illustrated by President Donald Trump’s
offer in August 2019 to purchase Greenland.
Greenland lies close to the North American continent, and its southern
part lies nearly halfway on the direct air route from U.S. to Western Europe. It
covers an area of 2.2 million km2 – 50 times the size of Denmark. Around 80%
of the area is covered with ice. The Greenlandic population is an indigenous
people (Inuit). Approximately 90% of the people living in Greenland are Inuit
(Kalaalit) and the rest are Scandinavian ethnicities, mostly Danes.1 The
different time periods and the resulting changes in the Inuit living conditions
have all contributed to the current society and the level of urbanization.
This chapter will illustrate that the Inuit’s interest in growth
management is closely connected to their interest in independency. I will
explain the special history of the development in this Arctic area and the
interests in a future based on the values of Inuit traditions that have to be
recovered in a new independent welfare state. As a reaction to Trumps offer in
August 2019 to Denmark on the purchase of Greenland, Greenland’s foreign
minister, Ane Lone Bagger, told Reuters that “We are open for business, but

* Professor Ellen Margrethe Basse, Department of Law, Business and Social Sciences, Aarhus
University, Denmark
1

Anne Merrild Hansen, Community Impacts: Public Participation, Culture and Democracy.
Background Paper for the Committee for Greenlandic Mineral Resources to the Benefit of
Society, Aalborg December 2013,
https://greenlandperspective.ku.dk/this_is_greenland_perspective/background/reportpapers/Community_Impacts.pdf (visited on 24 November 2019)
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we’re not for sale”. It is part of their identity that the development must not be
part of a problematic and different Western tradition. 2
Section two starts with a picture of the Greenlandic historical
development during the last 600 years. The full picture of the development also
includes the U.S. interests in Greenland and its military installations and
activities in the island. Greenland’s current integration in the Realm of Denmark
(Kunngeqarfik Danmark) and the Greenlandic interests in independency are
covered by section three, and the cultural and political identity, the language
and legislative traditions are covered by section four. Even though most of the
Inuit actually live in cities, such a modern, urban life is explained to be basically
excluded from Greenlandic identity.3 Section five describes the special
geographical and economic challenges that the Greenlandic society has to take
into account on its way to independency. This section explains Greenland’s
dependency of the yearly block grant from Denmark, the economic support
from the European Union (hereinafter the EU) as well as the Greenlandic
legislation of relevance for the current economic situation. The strategic
interests of the U.S. in Greenland are covered by section six. And finally, the
conclusion in section seven – i.e. that the Greenlandic population has an interest
in an enhancing independence of Denmark as well as an independence of other
states – is based on the explanations and analyses in the first six sections.
2. THE HISTORY BEHIND THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF GREENLAND
The first known settlements in the most Northernly part of Greenland
(called Peary Land) date back to around 2,500 B.C. when the Thule Inuit arrived
from Arctic America and Canada. The relationship with Europe started in the
Viking Age when people (the Northmen) from Iceland settled in the southern
part of Greenland. The Northmen were farmers and seafarers. In 1261, Iceland
accepted a subordinate status under the Norwegian crown and the settled
community in Greenland did likewise.4
2.1 Six Hundred Years of Inuit Society Under Foreign Impact
The history of the connection between Greenland and Denmark dates
back to 1380 when Denmark and Norway became a double monarchy, soon
with Denmark in the leading role. Via this union, the Danish Kingdom gained

2

Ulrik Pram Gad, Post-colonial identity in Greenland? When the empire dichotomizes back –
bringing politics back in, Journal of Languages and Politics, 2009, Vol 8, issue 1, at 142.
3

Ulrik Pram Gad, Post-colonial identity in Greenland? When the empire dichotomizes back –
bringing politics back in, (mentioned supra in note 2), at 141.
4

Axel Kjær Sørensen, Denmark-Greenland in the twentieth Century, Meddelelser om
Grønland (in English: Communication on Greenland), Man & Society, Vol. 34, 2007, at 11.
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access to the Norwegian tax territories that included Greenland. 5 During the
1400s, the living conditions became less favourable for the Northmen’s
domestic animals, and the population coming from the Nordic countries died
out in Greenland in 1500 – followed by a period without any contacts between
the countries. New waves of Eskimos came from Canada as the changes in the
climate conditions brought more favourable conditions for the hunters.
The Englishman John Davis’s expedition in 1585-1587 established
contact between the Greenlanders in the west and the Europeans. In the years
that followed, the interest in whale oil lighting caused an increased in whale
hunting in West Greenlandic waters by European (especially Danish) whalers.
In the summers of 1605-1607, King Christian IV of Denmark sent expeditions
to West Greenland.
The arrival in 1721 of the Danish-Norwegian missionary Hans Egede in
the area around Nuuk is often mentioned as the most important reasons why
Greenland now is part of Denmark. His activities were followed by the
establishment of a series of missions and trading posts under Danish
administration in West Greenland. 6 King Christian VI took over Greenland in
1726 as a Danish colony. 7 When the colony continued to operate at a loss, the
King in 1731 ordered that the establishment in Greenland should be abandoned,
and the colony was closed down. However, Hans Egede did not give up his
project, and he successfully appealed to the King’s conscience to allow the
mission work to continue in Greenland. 8 In 1732, the Danish owned
‘Greenlandic Trading Company’ was established, which came to have influence
on the living conditions of the Inuit, and in 1733 the Danish King decided to
accept Greenland as a crown territory.
Denmark lost Norway in 1814 in a war, but the separation of Norway
and Denmark did not affect the status of Greenland as part of the Danish State
monopoly. In 1903-1904, a Dane named Knud Rasmussen from Ilulissat visited

5

The Danish monarchy was at that time a major power in Northern Europe covering Norway,
southern and western Sweden, Germany north of Hamburg and Lubeck, and Greenland, the
Faroe Island and Iceland in the Northern Atlantic. Sweden and Norway were lost in 1814, as
Denmark was on the losing side in the Napoleonic Wars. Island became an independent State
in 1918 but chose to enter into a personal union with Denmark for the first 25 years of this
new arrangement.
6

Jørgen Taagholt and Jens Claus Hansen, Greenland: Security Perspectives, at 16 (the book is
available at https://www.arcus.org/publications/2001/greenland-security-perspectives visited
on 29 November 2019).
7

The Greenlandic territory was regarded as being under Danish sovereignty on an equal
footing with Iceland and the Faroe Islands, see the ICJs General List No. 43, judgment No. 20.
8

Axel Kjær Sørensen, Denmark-Greenland in the twentieth Century, (mentioned supra in note
4), at 12.
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northwest Greenland for the first time with the Danish Literary Expedition.
Norwegian hunters established themselves in uninhabited northeast areas in
1906. In 1909, the Greenland Board of Missions founded a Danish mission
station at Umanaq, and in 1910 a private trading post named Thule was
established by Knud Rasmussen in the same area. 9
In 1929, the East Greenlandic hunting company ‘Nanok’ was formed in
Greenland. With support from the Norwegian government, the Norwegian
hunters occupied parts of the area. These activities resulted in disagreement
between Danish and Norwegian interests. Therefore, Denmark presented a case
on the legal status of Eastern Greenland before the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) in the Hague. On 5 September 1933, the ICJ confirmed that the area was
Danish territory.10
2.2 The U.S.’s Military Interests and Activities in Greenland
In 1868, the U.S. Secretary of State William Seward – working as a
member of president Abraham Lincoln’s government – argued for an American
purchase of Greenland and Iceland. His arguments were that these areas would
give the U.S. influence in the North Atlantic in the same way as the purchase of
Alaska in 1867 from Russia brought the U.S. influence in the North Pacific. The
purchase idea was not accepted by Denmark.
When Denmark sold the three West Indian Islands – St. Thomas, St.
John and St. Croix – for U.S. $25 million, it used this sale to have its sovereignty
over Greenland acknowledged by the U.S. in a declaration of 4 August 1916.11
The Declaration states: 12
“In proceeding this day to the signature of the
Convention respecting the cession of Danish West-

9

Thule is the Greek name for the farthest corner of the world. Concerning the description of
this part of Greenland’s history, see Jørgen Taagholt and Jens Claus Hansen, Greenland:
Security Perspectives, (mentioned supra in note 6), at 17.
10

The judgment was made under the Twenty-Six session of the Permanent Court of
International Justice.
11

The Declaration is accessible in the Danish National Archives. Concerning this Declaration,
see e.g. Jørgen Taagholt and Jens Claus Hansen, Greenland: Security Perspectives, Arcus, at
18, and Iben Bjørnsson, Why is Greenland a part of the Danish Kingdom? in The Arctic
Journal, Thursday 23 June, 2016.
12

The citation is based on a picture of the declaration published with the Danish National
Archive’s approval in the thesis of Charlotte Glavind Bülow, Fried or Foe: The Chinese
Interests in Greenland and how it Impacts the Relationship Between Greenland and Denmark,
2018, at 35, available at http://www.martinbreum.dk/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/ThesisBülow-2018.pdf (Visited on 3 December 2019).
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Indian Islands to the United States of America, the
undersigned Secretary of State of the United States of
America, duly authorized by his Government, has the
honor to declare that the Government of the United
States of America will not object to the Danish
Government extending their political and economic
interests to the whole of Greenland.”
As Denmark was occupied by the German military during the Second
World War (1940-1945), Greenland was dependent on the U.S. 13 On 3 May
1940, the two Greenlandic District Councils decided that the two district
governors that were responsible for the administration of the Western and
Eastern parts of Greenland could make all necessary decisions required on the
security of Greenland. A resolution was adopted by the governors in the name
of the Greenlandic people, expressing hope that the U.S. would remember their
exposed position.14 On that background, the U.S. Coast Guard was sent to
Greenland in 1940 for inspection and transportation issues, and an American
consulate was established in Greenland. The territory had a geographical
position of importance both for transport between the U.S. and Europe and for
the metrological observations. The permanent American representation in Nuuk
was established in 1940, and the construction of a military bases and
infrastructure started in 1941. On 9 April 1941, the Danish ambassador
Kaufmann signed “The Agreement Relating to the Defence of Greenland”
(named the “Greenland Treaty”) in Washington. It gave the U.S the right to
establish and operate defence areas or military bases. The Danish government
declared itself not bound by this Treaty and fired Kauffmann – a decision that
was not accepted by Kauffmann, who stayed at work in Washington.15 In order
to support the U.S. Army personnel, the U.S. set up a large military hospital on
the eastern side of Narsarsuaq. Three airstrips were built by the U.S. Army –
the “Bluie West One”, the “Bluie West Two” and the “Bluie West Eight” – were
located away from major settlements, partly to ensure the isolation of the U.S.

13

Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, Greenland Geopolitics: Globalisation and Geopolitics in the
New North, Background Paper for the Committee for Greenlandic Mineral Resources to the
Benefit of Society, Copenhagen 2013,
https://greenlandperspective.ku.dk/this_is_greenland_perspective/background/reportpapers/Greenland_Geopolitics_Globalisation_and_Geopolitics_in_the_New_North.pdf
(visited the 24 November 2019).
14
Jørgen Taagholt and Jens Claus Hansen, Greenland: Security Perspectives, (mentioned
supra in note 6), at 2.
15
Jørgen Taagholt and Jens Claus Hansen, Greenland: Security Perspectives, (mentioned
supra in note 6), at 23.
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military in Greenland from the Greenlandic villages.16 The Bluie West Eight”
is now an international airport. It is no longer included in the U.S. military’s
facilities, but it is still very important for the urbanisation of Greenland. 17
The post-war Government of Denmark preferred withdrawal of the U.S.
troops and presented this interest before the U.S. Government. In response, the
U.S. claimed that the best solution would be for the U.S. to purchase Greenland
from Denmark. In 1946, president Harry Truman made an official offer to
Denmark to purchase Greenland for US$100 million with the purpose of
establishing military bases that could be used in the defence of the U.S. 18
Denmark did not accept the offer, however. A Danish Greenlandic Naval
District was established the same year with headquarters at Grønnedal and Nuuk
to provide a more permanent Danish military presence in Greenland. The U.S.
Army stayed in Greenland as the location of its facilities was of importance for
the defence of the U.S. in any possible global war.19 Denmark accepted that the
U.S. Army established a permanent defence from 1947, which also allowed for
the offensive use of the U.S. bombers in strikes on the Soviet Union. In 1948,
an agreement was reached with the Government of Denmark on a continued
U.S. presence. The increased geopolitical importance of Greenland impacted
the Danish wish to keep Greenland as a colony and to join the North Atlantic
Treaty of 4 April 1949 (on NATO). On 27 April 1951 an agreement between
the U.S. and the Government of Denmark was signed pursuant to the North
Atlantic Treaty on the ‘Defence Agreement’. In June 1951, the U.S. navy used
120 ships to transport 12,000 men and 300,000 tons of cargo to Thule for the
construction of the Thule Airbase. In May 1953, the Inuit that were located in
Uummannaq – an area close to the airbase – were relocated to areas
approximately 130 km north of Thule at Qaanaaq on the southern tip of Red
Cliff Peninsula. It was part of the Danish strict isolation policy after the Second
World War to ensure that the installations of the U.S. Army were located
relatively far from the Inuit settlements to maintain sovereignty over
Greenland.20

16

Inatsisartut Act No. 12 of 5 December 2008 on Airports and an agreement from 2010
establish the basis for new airports closer to the Greenlandic cities.
17

It is now the international Kangerlussuaq Airport that is located in the Qeqqata
municipality.
18

Natalia Loukacheva, The American promise: Legal and Political Autonomy of Greenland
and Nunavut, University of Toronto, 2007, at 132.
19
Jørgen Taagholt and Jens Claus Hansen, Greenland: Security Perspectives, (mentioned
supra in note 6), at 28.
20
Jørgen Taagholt and Jens Claus Hansen, Greenland: Security Perspectives, (mentioned
supra in note 6), at 18.
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The idea that the U.S. should buy Greenland from Greenland was
presented again in 1960 by President Eisenhower as a reaction to a Danish
disarmament plan covering Greenland. Denmark gave up the plan, and the U.S.
Army could stay in Greenland.
On 13 March 1991 – and again on 21 February 2003 – the “Defence
Agreement” between the U.S. and the Danish Government in Copenhagen was
supplemented by a memorandum of understanding concerning the use of
aviation facilities related to the U.S. military activities. On 6 August 2004 the
‘Defence Agreement’ (also named the “Igaliku Agreement”) was supplemented
by a Joint Declaration signed by the U.S., the Government of Denmark, and the
Home Rule Government of Greenland accepting the position of the lastmentioned government as a party to the agreement.21
3. GREENLAND AS A MEMBER OF THE DANISH REALM AND ITS INTERESTS IN
INDEPENDENCE
Greenland was a Danish colony until the latest amendment of the Danish
Constitution in 1953.22 Greenland was integrated into Denmark by the amended
Constitution in harmony with the obligations under the United Nations’ Charter
Chapter XI and the criteria for the determination when a decolonisation is
fulfilled established by the General Assembly.23 The General Assembly
acknowledged that Greenland was no longer a colony.24 This integration was
decided without the democratic means necessary to involve the Inuit in their
new status, but the rights of the Inuit in Greenland have been made clearer by
later decisions of the General Assembly. 25
Based on section 1 of the Constitution, it shall apply to all parts of the
Kingdom of Denmark. There are limitations laid down in the Constitution in

21

The Agreement was published as a Danish Statutory Order No. 6 of 28 April 2005.

22

Danish Act No. 169 of 5 June 1953 on the Constitution of the Danish Kingdom. The basic
constitutional philosophy is one of careful change, respecting precedents but taking account of
changes in the values of society. The Constitution has only been amended in 1855, 1866,
1915, 1920, and in 1953.
23

The General Assembly’s resolutions No. 567 of 18 January 1952, No. 648 of 10 December
1952 and No. 742 of 27 November 1953.
24

This constitutional change was made without involving the Greenlandic population.

25

United Nations’ Charter’s Chapter XI and resolutions of the General Assembly, including
resolution No. 1541 of 5 December 1960 on ”Principles which should guide Members in
determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under
Article 73(e) of the Charter”, have importance for the position of Greenland in the Danish
Realm, see Erik Beukel, Frede P. Jensen and Jens Elo Rytter, Phasing out the Colonial Status
of Greenland 1945-54. A historical study, Meddelelser om Grønland (Communications on
Greenland) 2010.
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respect to the competence for the Danish authorities in Copenhagen to delegate
their powers to the Greenlandic authorities. Among these limitations are the
security and foreign policy power, as section 20 of the Constitution only
describes one government (the King) with the competence to act in international
affairs on behalf of all parts of the Danish Realm. Therefore, the Danish
Government in Copenhagen takes care of the defence and most of the foreign
policy.
3.1 Denmark’s Entry into the European Community in 1973
On 1 January 1973, Denmark became a member of the European Economic
Community (EEC) along with the United Kingdom and Ireland. The Act on
Denmark’s accession to the EEC26 contains the necessary provisions for the
transfer of some of the constitutional authorities to the EU institutions on the
basis of section 20 of the Danish Constitution. Greenland became a member of
the EEC when Denmark joined it. However, 70% of the Inuit were against this
decision due to the concomitant loss of their right to decide themselves on
fishing rights and export of fish. This event was decisive in the independency
interests of the Inuit.27 As described below, following the introduction of the
Home Rule Government system, a referendum was held in Greenland leading
to resignation in 1985.
3.2 Home Rule Government in Greenland from 1979
A Greenlandic Home Rule Government was established by an Act
passed by the Danish Parliament in 1978. The Act delegated some power –
including the power to regulate the environment, internal affairs on fishing and
hunting rights, and parts of the power in respect to decision-making on
extraction of raw materials.28 After this governance system was established,
Greenland held a consultative referendum on membership of the EEC in 1982.
When leaving the EEC in 1985, the relation to the EEC was replaced by an
Overseas Countries and Territory (OCT) status, and Greenland retained its
competence to regulate fishing itself.
A transfer of some competence from the Danish authorities to the Home
Rule Government to act internationally in areas was made by the Act on the
Conclusion of Agreement under International law by the Home Rule

26

Danish Act No. 447 of 11 October 1972 on Denmark’s Accession has been changed several
times.
27

Marc Jacobsen, Greenland’s Arctic advantage: Articulations of sovereignty games, in
‘Cooperation and Conflict’, Sage Journal, 2019 https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836719882476,
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010836719882476 (visited on 3 December 2019).
28

Danish Act No. 29 of 29 November 1978 on Home Rule for Greenland.
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Government of Greenland.29 The competence was related to areas that were
only of relevance for Greenland – including its capacity to take part in
agreements on fishing rights in the Greenlandic marine areas. The Act came
into force in July 2005.
3.3 Self-Government in Greenland from 2009
In 2008, Greenlanders favored increased independence from Denmark
in a referendum. An agreement on a new constitutional position of Greenland
was made between the Greenlandic Government and the Government in
Copenhagen. On 21 June 2009, the Act on Greenland Self-Government
(Kalaallit Nunaanni) came into force.30 After this, Greenland’s authorities
consist of a directly elected Greenland Parliament (Inatsisartut) comprising
thirty-one members and seven political parties. 31 The Government
(Naalakkersuisut) is responsible for the central administration. The local
administration is divided into five municipalities. 32
The Self-Government Act gives full powers to Greenland to negotiate
and to conclude under international law where such agreements relate solely to
Greenland – as for example, mineral resource activities and fishing activities in
Greenland and the marine territory of Denmark/Greenland. The delegation of
power does not apply to international agreement, which shall also apply to
Denmark or agreements to be negotiated within an international organisation of
which the Kingdom of Denmark is a member. The Act gives the Greenlandic
authorities the right to take over most of the legal, administrative and judicial
competences. It provides for a system of information and cooperation with the
High Commissioner of Greenland to ensure that the full power of the
Greenlandic authorities is used within the limits of their constitutional statutes
and that it is not used contrary to the general interests of the Danish Kingdom.
The competence in offshore extraction has been taken over, and the Greenlandic
Mineral Resources Act now regulates such activities.33 The competence to
protect the marine areas beyond three nautical miles has not, however, been
taken over. It is the authorities of the Kingdom of Denmark that are the main

29

Danish Act No. 577 of 24 June 2005 on the Conclusion of Agreement under International
law by the Home Rule Government of Greenland.
30

Danish Act No. 473 of 12 June 2009 on Greenlandic Self-Government. The Act covers the
overall structure for the authorities that consist of a directly elected Greenland Parliament
(Inatsisartut), and the Government (Naalakkersuisut).
31

Siumut, Inuit Ataqatigiit, Demokraatit, Partii Naleraq, Atassut, Suleqatigiissitsisuit and
Nunatta Qitornai.
32

Kommune Kujalleq, Kommuneqarfik Sermersooq, Qeppata Kommunia, Kommune
Qeqertalik and Avannata Kommune.
33
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responsible party for the protection of the marine area, and also for the
international and internal obligations on emergency response planning and
emergency preparedness and response. The Marine Environmental Protection
Act,34 decided by the Danish authorities, covers the environmental protection
of the Greenlandic marine area outside three nautical miles.35
The Greenlandic population has the right under the Self-Government
Act to withdraw from the Danish Realm, if it so desires, when the wish has been
expressed in a referendum in Greenland. The decision on total independency of
Denmark will be subject to approval by the Inatsisartut and the Danish
Parliament.
3.4 Free Association Perspectives and Greenlandic Independency
Based on the international principles described by the General
Assembly36 for the determination of when a colony should be regarded as
having attained a “full measure of self-government” the Greenlandic politicians
in power have already in the Home Rule Governmental period argued for
independence of Denmark. The Danish political approach has been criticized
for being integrationist, acknowledging the economic dominance of the
European part of Denmark (with it Parliament and Government in
Copenhagen).
When the European Commission in the 1990’s presented a draft
Regulation on Trade in Seal Products, the Greenlandic Home Rule Parliament
was very critical. The proposed prohibition of import of sealskin into the
Member States of the European Community was regarded by the Greenlandic
political parties as affecting Greenland’s original Inuit culture. It was seen as
one of many consequences of Greenland’s constitutional situation (a
continuation of the colonial position). After this intervention, a modification

34

Danish Royal Decision No. 1035 of 22 October 2004 on the Marine Environmental Act,
coming into force in Greenland with effect on the area beyond three nautical miles of the coast
of Greenland. The very unclear division of responsibility between the Greenlandic and Danish
authorities has been criticized by the Danish ‘Rigsrevisionen’(the Danish national audit
office) in 2013 in ‘Beretning til Statsrevisorerne om Danmarks indsats i Arktis’ (Report to the
Public Accounts Committee on Denmark’s effort in the Arctic).
35

It is the Danish military authorities that act in situations of oil spill in this Arctic area to
fulfil the international obligations of the Kingdom of Denmark.
36

Ulrik P. Gad, National Identity Politics and Postcolonial Sovereignty Games, Museum
Tusculanum Press, 2016 and Mikkel U. Østergaard, The Greenlandic wish for independency.
An Investigation of the possibility within free association, Master Thesis, Aalborg University,
Denmark, 2017, http://www.martinbreum.dk/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Masters-thesisMikkel-Underlin-Østergaard.pdf (visited on 2 December 2019)
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was included in the final version of the Regulation on Trade in Seal Products.37
The Member States can now import skin produced by traditional Inuit hunters. 38
All but one of the seven political parties currently in the Inatsisartut
agree that Greenland’s ultimate and overarching goal is to become an
independent national state. As part of the strategy on such a future, three of the
Greenlandic political powerful parties – Siumut,39 Inuit Ataqatigiit and Parti
Naleraq – have signed a ‘Coalition Agreement’ which they often refer to in their
political priorities for the development in Greenland. In the preamble of
‘Coalition Agreement’ it is stated that:40
“Greenland is irreversibly on its way to independence,
and this process requires not only political stability, but
also national unity. The parties agree to submit
proposals for a new constitution at the end of this
legislative term”.
In 2011 and again in the Fall of 2015, Inatsisatut asked Naalakkersuisut
to draw up a proposal on the establishment of a Greenlandic constitutional
commission. The decision on the establishment of the commission was to be
made by Inatsisatut.41 On 26 April 2017 the Constitutional Commission was

37

European Parliament and Council Regulation No. 1007/2009 of on Trade in Seal Products.

38

Ulrik P. Gad, Greenland: A post-Danish sovereign nation state in the making, in
‘Cooperation and Conflict’, Sage Journal, 2014, https://vbn.aau.dk/en/publications/greenlanda-post-danish-sovereign-nation-state-in-the-making (visited on 4 December 2019).
39

Since 2014, the concept of ‘free association’ with Denmark has served as the official and
declared framework in Siumut’s political program, see Mikkel U. Østergaard, The
Greenlandic wish for independency. An Investigation of the possibility within free association,
(mentioned supra in note 36),
40

The “Coalition Agreement. 2016-2018. Equality, Security. Development” was signed on 4
December 2014 as the second version of this. The first agreement was signed on 26 March
2013.
41

The Greenlandic Self Government, Redegørelse for nedsættelse af en Grønlands
forfatningskommission (The Communication on the Establishment of the Greenlandic
Constitutional Commission), 2016,
https://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Files/Publications/Departementet%20for%20Natur
%20Miljoe%20og%20Energi/DK%20Redegoerelse%20for%20nedsaettelse%20af%20en%20
groenlandsk%20forfatningskommission.pdf (visited on 2 December 2019).
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established with representatives from the Greenlandic political parties. 42 It has
to include in its work:43
“an assessment of a constitution based on the concept of
a free association or some other form of
intergovernmental cooperation with another state.”
The reaction to the establishment of the Commission from the former
Danish Government in Copenhagen (that was in power until June 2019) was
very negative.44 The work of this Commission has not been finished yet.
The current Danish Government in Copenhagen is more open in its
approach to the Greenlandic interest in having more power in relation to
decisions on its foreign affairs, but the Danish Prime minister, Mette
Frederiksen, has been criticised for her meeting with Trump under the NATO
meeting in December 2019, in which they discussed a future U.S.-Danish
partnership on Arctic security policy without including the Greenlandic
Government in their discussion. In the Danish Defence Intelligence Agency’s
publication on 20 November 2019 it is clearly stated that the security situation
in the Arctic has the highest priority.45
4. GREENLANDIC IDENTITY, DANISH LANGUAGE, AND LEGAL TRADITION
The Greenlandic identity is partly understood with reference to
aboriginal Inuit culture. This culture involves settlements, a network of camps
linked by rapid travel across ice and frozen land. The Danish colonization of
Greenland with the introduction of Christianity and trade economy in the 1600
to 1900s was clearly a move towards a foreign culture. A shift in the culture was
also the consequence of the development of the main livelihood in 1900-1940
42

The members of the commissions are: two representing Siumut (including the chairperson),
two representing Inuit Ataqatigiit, one representing Partii Naleraq, and one member from
Atassut. The political party Demokraatit has not decided whether it want to be represented in
the Commission.
43

See the publication of the mandate by the Naalakkersuisut in Danish,
https://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Kommissoriet/Kommissori
et.pdf (visited on 2 December 2019).
44

The coalition government that was in power from 2015 to 2019 – a minority liberalconservative government – consisted of the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party and the
Liberal Alliance. They were in power with support from the Danish People’s Party. The
election to the Danish Parliament was held on 5 June 2019 resulted in a change of
government. On 27 June 2019, a new Social Democrat Government took overpower.
45

Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste, Efterretningsmæssig Risikovurdering 2019. En aktuel
vurdering af forholdene i udlandet af betydning for Danmarks sikkerhed. (in English: Defense
Intelligence Service, Intelligence Risk Assessment 2019. A current assessment of conditions
abroad is important for Denmark's security.)
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from fishing activities to hunting of marine mammals. The urbanisation started
by the movement of people from a large number of small villages to larger
population centres.46 From the 1950s/1960s until now, the town population has
increased rapidly. This development is often depicted as the reason why the
Inuit have become alienated in relation to the cities and from their family-based
network.47 The standard of living, housing and health conditions in the cities
have been significantly improved since the mid-20 th century when the shift from
a traditional Inuit community to a modern society started. However, the social
changes and the adaptation to the modern society living conditions have not
been without social problems for the Inuit living in the cities. At the same time,
Denmark’s essentialized images of the Inuit have been problematic, as they
have been constructed as uncivilized and primitive, lazy and ineffective, and
amoral.48
4.1 Kakaallisut and the Challenges Related to this Official Language
Since the Home Rule Governmental system started, the official
language in Greenland has been ‘kalaallisut’.49 This language stands central in
Greenlandic identity politics today as prominent element of the Eskimo-Aleut
identity, closely related to the languages spoken by the Inuit in Canada, in
Alaska, and in Siberia.50
The level of education in the Greenlandic society is low compared with
other modern states. Danish is taught as a second language from the first grade
on, and English is taught from the lowest grades. After finishing elementary
school, about half of the young people study one year at a continuing school in
Greenland or Denmark. They have free access to the Danish education system.

46

Gitte Tróndheim, Greenlandic urbanization and urban life – Decline or development? in
Klaus Georg Hansen, Rasmus Ole Rasmussen and Ryan Weber (eds.) Proceedings from the
First International Conference on Urbanisation in the Arctic. Conference 28-30 April 2012
Ilimmarfik, Nuuk, Greenland, at 75.
47

Gitte Tróndheim, Greenlandic urbanization and urban life – Decline or development?
(mentioned supra in note 45), at 76 s.
48

Ulrik Pram Gad, Naja Dyrendom Graugaard, Anders Holgersen, Nina Lave and Nikoline
Schriver, Imagining China on Greenland’s Road to Independency, in the Arctic Yearbook
2018, see https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2018/China-and-theArctic/1_AY2018_Gad.pdf (visited on 3 December 2019).
49

It is stated in Section 20 of the Danish Act No. 473 of 12 June 2009 on Greenlandic SelfGovernment. The Act covers the overall structure for the authorities that consist of a directly
elected Greenland Parliament (Inatsisartut), and the Government (Naalakkersuisut).
50

The language in Canada is Inuktitut, in Alaska it is Inupiaq, and in Siberia it is Yupik.
Concerning the impact of the position of ‘kalaallisut’ on the possibility for Greenland to
become an independent national state see section 5 of this chapter.
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Only one out of seven continue directly to upper secondary education. 51 Many
of the young people from Greenland who want to study in Denmark have
problems meeting the qualification level needed.
One consequence of the policy on the language have been an exclusion
of Danish speaking Inuit from some positions that are generally manned with
persons speaking kalaallisut.52 The exclusion of monolingual Danish speakers
who consider themselves Greenlanders are also a challenge as the exclusion has
consequences for Greenland on its way to legal, political and economic
independency as Greenland does not have a kalaallisut-based legislation and the
interaction with people outside Eskimo-Aleut societies cannot be based on
kalaallisut.53
4.2 The Danish Language and Legal Tradition
Fluency in Danish and higher education (acquired in Denmark) is
generally required today in Greenland’s leading positions – including the
ministries of Naalakkersuisut. The continued need for well-educated Danes in
the Greenlandic public administration and several other Greenlandic sectors has
impact on the Inatsisartut legislation.54
The acts passed by Inatsisartut on the regulation of business are very
open framework regulations. When the acts are designed – and when
complicated legal conflicts occur – Danish Law firms play an important role in
the interpretation and application of the rules. The public administration has a
broad discretionary power as there are not many detailed administrative rules.
The words etc. used in the acts are Danish and the design of the acts is based on
the Danish traditions. This legal system is generally considered to be a civil law
system, although it is in common with other Scandinavian legal systems that the
legal systems are not as influenced by Roman law as other European civil law
systems. Under the Scandinavian legal tradition, the preparatory works of the
legislator are an important legal source used in the interpretation of the rules,
and these works are often referring to the Danish acts that have been used as

51

Statistics Greenland, Greenland in Figures 2019, at 13.

52
Ulrik Pram Gad, Post-colonial identity in Greenland? When the empire dichotomizes back –
bringing politics back in, Journal of Languages and Politics, 2009, Vol 8, issue 1, at 145.
53

Ulrik Pram Gad, Post-colonial identity in Greenland? When the empire dichotomizes back –
bringing politics back in, (mentioned supra in note 52), at 146.
54

Peter Bjerregaard, Tine Curtis, the Greenlandic Population Study, Cultural change and
mental health in Greenland: the association of childhood conditions, language, and
urbanization with mental health and suicidal thoughts among the Inuit of Greenland, in Social
Science & Medicine, 54(2002) at 33-48.
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models. The delegated discretionary power is used by the public bureaucracy
with Danish-speaking and educated personnel.
5. THE CHALLENGES RELATED TO GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMY
The Greenlandic area is Arctic/Sub Arctic with permanent ice cap
covering most of the island. Human habitation is only possible in the coastal
areas. The distances from the southern to northern part of Greenland is 2,670
km, and from East to West it is 1,050 km. The coastline is 44,087 km. 55 Means
of transport are either by sea or air. In the Northern part of the territory it is still
possible to communicate by foot or dog-sled on the frozen sea and fiords in
winter, but the smelting is still making it more dangerous.
In Greenland, there was originally a general right for the Inuit to use the
land and its resources, but today there is self-governing ownership of the land.
The phenomenon of private ownership of real estate does not exist in Greenland.
Only the right to establish buildings etc. is obtained upon application in
accordance with the land allocation rules laid down in the Planning and Land
Registration Act.56
Greenland’s public revenues and expenditures are not in balance.
Denmark’s current block subsidies cover 54% of the expenses included in
Greenland’s national budget.57
5.1 Geographical Distances and Population Structure
The geographical distance to external markets and the large distances
internally between inhabited areas of the Arctic mean that it is difficult to secure
services and goods, etc. under normal market conditions. Many Greenlandic
companies are therefore established – and 100% owned – by the Greenland SelfGovernment.

55

Torben M. Andersen, The Greenlandic Economy – Structure and Prospects, Department of
Economics and Business, Aarhus University, June 2015 (published on the Internet,
https://econ.au.dk/fileadmin/site_files/filer_oekonomi/Working_Papers/Economics/2015/wp1
5_14.pdf
(visited on 19 November 2019).
56

Inatsisartut Act No. 17 of 17. November 2010 om Planning and Land Registration.

57

The Danish state provides an annual subsidy, which is stipulated in section 5 of the SelfGovernment Act. The subsidy is adjusted annually in accordance with the increase in the
general price and salary index of the Finance Act, and it is set at DKK 3,439.6 million. DKK
(stated in 2009 price and salary level). If Greenland's Self-Government receives income from
raw material activities, the subsidy is reduced, cf. section 8 of the Act.
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The population consist of 56,000 inhabitants scattered around a vast
coastal area. Today about 60% of the population live in the five largest cities. 58
Two Greenlandic cities have the highest population growth, namely the capital
of Nuuk on the West Coast and Tasiilaq on the East Coast. The rest of the cities
are also experiencing an influx of people from the smaller cities and villages.
None of the cities are connected by roads. However, the population structure is
set to change appreciably in the years to come in the projection up to 2028 –
made by the Greenlandic Economic Council in its 2019 report on the
Greenlandic economy. It is described as a future fall in the total population from
approximately 56,000 individuals to a level of around 54,000 individuals. By
2048, the population is estimated to be 48,000 individuals. 59 The Council is
highlighting that this fall has a number of socioeconomic consequences. This
fall in the total population is by the Council explained to be the principal cause
of Greenland’s fiscal sustainability problem. 60
5.2 Danish Block Subsidies and Investments in Infrastructure, etc.
The Greenlandic economy is heavily dependent on economic transfers
from Copenhagen to provide for basic services. Greenland receives DKK 3,681
million (approximately U.S.$700 million) as a yearly block grant from
Denmark. In addition to this, the Danish State covers the cost of the judicial
system, education at the highest level of the young people that want to have
their education in Denmark, defence as well as scientific knowledge from the
Danish universities and sector research institutions. 61
In relation to the Greenlandic ambition on more self-sustainable
economy it is highlighted by the Greenlandic Economic Council in its 2019
Report on “Greenland’s Economy 2019” 62 that subsidies from abroad account
for just under half of the total revenue for the public sector and in addition the
public cost of the responsibilities not yet devolved to Greenland from Denmark
under the Self-Government Act (this is e.g. the case with the protection of the
marine environment outside 1 nautical miles), together with the cost of activities
related to foreign affairs, defence and security policy.

58

The five largest cities are Nuuk (the capital), Sisimut, Ilulissat, Aasiaat and Qaqortoq.

59

The Greenlandic Economic Council, Greenland’s Economy 2019, (Aningaasagarnermut
Siunnersuisogatigiit), at 26-27.
https://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Finans/ENG/GØR%202019
%20ENG.pdf (visited on 4 December 2019)
60

The Greenlandic Economic Council, Greenland’s Economy 2019, (mentioned in note 59), at
26.
61

Denmark’s Statistical Yearbook 2017, at 426.

62

The report of Greenland’s Economic Council (mentioned in note 59), at 32.
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The U.S.’s interests in stopping the Chinese investments in Greenland
as well as the Chinese plan for a “Polar Silk Road” have impact on the current
Danish financing of the Greenlandic infrastructure and city development. In the
fall of 2017, Denmark denied Chinese companies to bid for a development
project of the three Greenlandic airports after originally selecting the CCCC as
a finalist for the U.S.$560 million project. In September 2018, Denmark
invested approximately U.S.$100 million in the establishment of three new
airports in Nuuk, Ilussat and Qaqortoq to help the U.S. keep the Chinese
investments out of Greenland.63
5.3 Greenland as an OCT and its Agreements with the European Union
A bilateral agreement – the “Greenlandic Treaty “– was concluded
between Greenland/Denmark and the EEC in 1985. This Treaty – together with
Greenland’s status as an overseas country and territory (OCT) – provided a
special opportunity for the conclusion of agreements between the EEC on the
one hand and Denmark/Greenland on the other. On the basis of Greenland’s
OCT-status, a fisheries partnership agreement was already concluded in 1985.
The fishing rights obtained by the European Community in Greenland’s waters
were offset by an annual economic contribution to the public economic budget
in Greenland. In 2006, the agreement was replaced by the “Qajaq agreement”,
which is divided into two agreements: a commercial agreement based on the
fisheries agreement and a partnership agreement. Unlike the previous
agreement, the payment for the current fisheries agreement is subject to market
conditions, so a decline in world market prices may involve a reduction in
payment from the European Community (now the EU).
The current fisheries partnership between the EU and Greenland for the
period 2013-2020 has a financial frame at U.S.$17,824,274, including a
financial reserve of at U.S.$1,882,068 for additional quantities of species as set
out in the protocol. In the exclusive summary of the program “For the
sustainable development of Greenland 2014-2020”64 it is stated that EU’s
economic support is part of Greenland policy on having – in the long term –
self-sustained economy and to phase out the annual block grant from Denmark.
The EU has also offered various funding opportunities for Greenlandic projects
that can promote a sustainable development. Greenlandic researchers are also
invited to take part in EU’s research programs financing big projects. It is also
63

The U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Katie Wheelbarger, did warn Denmark
about the China’s motives and the economic power is used to establish a military presence,
see Hans Lucht, Chinese investment in Greenland raise US concerns, in DIIS Policy Brief, 20
November 2018. Naalakkersuisut has also injected capital into KAIR/Greenland’s
International Airports.
64

The program is signed as an agreement between Naalakkersuisut and the European
Commission.
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explained by some researchers that Greenland’s relationship with the EU in the
period from 1985 and up to now intimately has been interwoven with the
Greenlandic developments toward independency. 65
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the ‘Greenland Treaty’
expired. Subsequently, the framework is laid down in Articles 198-203 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) concerning the OCTs,
as well as Article 204 TFEU and the Protocol 34 “On the special scheme for
Greenland”. The EU’s general policy on its relations with OCTs – including
Greenland – presupposes the dissemination of EU environmental policy. 66 The
joint declaration of 19 March 2015 between the EU and Greenland/Denmark
established a new basis for relations between the parties, comprising several
common objectives on sustainable development.67 By this non-binding
document, the EU confirms its long-lasting links between the parties. The
relation established by this partnership aims to facilitate consultation and
political dialogue on issues of common interest and any other areas within the
declaration. The interest of the EU in the Arctic development is clearly
explained for example in the EU’s seventh Environment Action Program,
entitled “Living well, within the limits of our planet”, for the period 2013–2020,
objective 9 highlights that:
“… particular emphasis should be given to the. . . Arctic
regions, where there is a need for intensified cooperation
and increased Union involvement....”
There has however, been some problems in this relationship between the
Inuit and the EU as a consequence of the EU’s Regulation on Trade in Seal
Products. The Inuit in Greenland and Canada have ensured that this regulation
is accepted by the Arctic Council as a barrier to the EU’s possibility of getting
a position as a permanent member of the Council. On 26 October 2015, the
European Commission recognized special conditions for the Greenlandic
hunters to be respected by the Member States of the EU to ensure that they did
not prohibit import of these hunters seal products.68 The Commission has also
recognized the such conditions for the Inuit in Canada.

65

See e.g. Ulrik P. Gad, Greenland: A post-Danish sovereign nation state in the making
(mentioned in note 38).
66

The Commission’s Greenbook, Future relations between the EU and the Overseas
Countries and Territories, COM (2008) 383 final.
67

The declaration is made with reference to the Council Decision of 14 March 2014.

68

The Commission Decision 2015/C 355/05 of 26 October 2015 recognizing the Greenlandic
Development of Fisheries, Hunting and Agriculture (APNN) in accordance with Article 3 of
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5.4 Greenlandic Business and Inatsisartut’s Land Use and Business
Legislation
The cornerstones of the Greenlandic business are fisheries/industry,
mineral resources, tourism and land-based industry. The economy of Greenland
is first and foremost heavily dependent on its fisheries sector. It is the official
policy that the Greenlandic authorities will develop a raw material economy
that, together with a modern fishing industry and tourism, will enable a political
independence of Denmark by virtue of the achieved financial independence of
the Danish block grant.
Due to the very weak economic, educational and employment
conditions currently at issue in Greenland, the Inatsisartut Mineral Resources
Act69 provides for a number of requirements for those who apply for and who
are granted licenses. The Act provides for the operators to prepare a special
assessment of the societal consequences of new projects as part of their project
descriptions. Such analyses are called Social Sustainability Assessments
(VBS).70 It is also permissible to include as condition on the utilization of
licenses the obligation for the operators to take part in tripartite agreement (IBA)
– i.e. on the education and employment of locals, etc. – between the operator(s),
the Naalakkersuisut and (in some cases) the relevant municipalities. Both
licenses and contracted IBAs require that those who receive a license must
support the education and capacity building of the local population, as well as
employ local businesses and local labour.71 The Act also provides for the
mandatory condition that Nunaoil A/S, which is 100% owned by Greenland's
Self-Government,72 must take over as a ‘right holder’ when licenses for
extractive activities are granted.73
The Greenland Mineral Resources Act and the ‘Large-Scale Act’ 74 are
characterized by an ambition to attract investment from strong multinational

Commission Implementation of Regulation (EC) No. 1007/2009 of the European Parliament
and Council on Trade in Seal Products.
69

Inatsisatut Act No 7 of 7 December 2009 on Mineral Resources and Activities of
Importance for the Extraction as amended. (In English
https://www.govmin.gl/images/stories/faelles/mineral_resources_act_unofficial_translation.pd
f visited on 3 December 2019)
70

Impact Benefit Agreements (BIA) regulated by section 78a of the Raw Materials Act.

71

Sections 17-18 of the Raw Materials Act.

72

Nunaoil A/S is established by the Inatsisartut Act No 15 of 7 December 2009.

73

Section 18 and Chapter18 (sections 32-38) of the Raw Materials Act.

74

Inatsisart Act No. 25 of 18 December 2012 on Construction Works on Large-Scale Projects.
Clarification and amendment of rules on foreign workers' wages and conditions of
employment, collective agreements and the exercise of labor rights, etc. (as amended). (In
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corporations and economically strong states, including China. When
Naalakkersuisut in October 2012 presented the bill on this Act, it explained that
the intentions behind the new rules were to make it possible for foreign
companies to bring their own native workers to Greenland to work on conditions
applicable in their native countries (expected from China). It was stated in the
comments to the bill that it was necessary to allow such foreign working
conditions in order to improve the global competitive conditions in Greenlandic
mineral and hydrocarbon extraction industry. The Act was seen as a mean to
achieving a self-sustaining Greenlandic economy within a foreseeable number
of years.75
5.5 Naalakkersuisut’s Strategy on a Self-Sustainable Economy
Many Greenlandic activities are undertaken by the companies that are
wholly or partly owned by the Greenlandic authorities and they are of crucial
importance to the Greenlandic society. In the report of Greenland’s Economic
Council mounting public debts are expected in the municipal limited companies
and limited companies owned by Naalakkersuisut.76
In 2013, it was estimated that new revenues or savings worth at least one
billion DKK have to be created each year for the next many years. 77 The
economic activities increased in 2016-2019, and this trend remains buoyant, but
the Economic Council is recommending a stronger focus on coherent reform
measures to address social challenges and enable more people to be able to pay
their own way.78 In 2020, economic growth is expected to increase by 4%
owing, for example, to the commencement of construction work at the Nuuk
and Ilulissat airports – paid partly by the Danish authorities.79
To ensure a future as an independent national state, Naalakkersuisut’s
“Sustainability and Growth Plan” was published in 2016 with the following four
main themes: 1) a higher level of education, 2) boosting growth and conversion

English https://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Files/Publications/Erhverv/LargeScale%20Project%20Act/Unofficial%20translation%20of%20The%20LargeScale%20Project
s%20Act%20incl%20amendments.pdf (visit on 3 December 2019)
75

The Bill EM2012/110 of 5 October 2012 on the Inatsisatut Act on Construction Works on
Large-Scale Projects, published in.
76

The Greenlandic Economic Council, Greenland’s Economy 2019 (mentioned in note 59), at

5.
77

It is stated in the conference material “Future Greenland 2013: Vision to reality” held by
Employer’s Association of Greenland on 6-7 February 2013 in Nuuk, Greenland.
78

Greenland’s Economy Council, ‘Greenland’s Economy 2019’ (mentioned in note 59), at 4-

6.
79

Greenland’s Economic Council, Greenland’s Economy 2019 (mentioned in note 59), at 4.
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to a multi-faceted economy, 3) modernisation of the public sector, and 4) greater
self-sufficiency through reforms of welfare benefits, the tax system and
housing. This is not a policy that is easy to get accepted by the Inuit. The largest
Greenland protest action was caused by this policy. On 1 May 2019, the
Greenlandic Member of the Danish Parliament 80 – representing the Inuit
Ataqatigiit – was criticizing the Naalakkersuisut for not presenting an economic
plan for Greenland’s future as an independent state. On 18 November 2019, the
population protested against a recently passed act of higher taxes on sugar and
alcohol.
6. THE U.S.’S CURRENT INTERESTS IN GREENLAND
The geographic/-strategic location81 as well as the consequences of the
melting of the northern icecap have increased the U.S.’s interests in Greenland.
Following Trump's failed attempt to buy Greenland and his cancellation of his
visit to Denmark in September 2019, new initiatives have been taken by the
U.S. Embassy in Copenhagen to ensure a closer cooperation with Greenland. In
May 2019 the Embassy announced that the U.S. is to reestablish a permanent
Department of State presence in Greenland. This announcement was received
by the Greenlandic Government with a ‘welcome’. The Greenlandic Minister
for Foreign Affairs Anne Lone Bagger stated:82
“Greenland is a part of North America. Not only
geographically, but also throughout ethnicity, culture
and language, which we share with Inuit across Alaska
and Arctic Canada. However, despite our geographical
closeness, cooperation and economic exchange between
Greenland and the U.S. could be much more evident.”
On 4 November 2019, the American embassy in Denmark announced
the establishment of a seven-person “Greenlandic Specialist American
Embassy” in the capital of Greenland (Nuuk) in 2020 with the following text:

80

The Parliament has 179 members of whom two are elected in Greenland and two in the
Faroe Islands.
81

Greenland spans more than 24 degrees of latitude – 2,670 km from north to south – and 60
degrees of longitude covering 1,200 km from the west coast to the east coast. The northern
part, Nordpynten, lies only 700 km from the North Pole – the southern part Cap Farwell lies
2,600 km further south.
82

Press release at the homepage of the Greenlandic Government regarding the U.S.
reestablishment of a permanent Department of State presence in Greenland,
https://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/Naalakkersuisut/News/2019/05/0905_genoprettelse (visit on 25
November 2019).
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“A job announcement for the position indicate that the
individual hired for the “Greenlandic Specialist,
American Embassy, Nuuk” will need to speak
Kalaallisut (Greenlandic), Danish and English and will
be responsible for gathering information for U.S.
decision-makers as Washington seeks to expand
commercial and diplomatic connections with the country
that President Donald Trump earlier this year suggested
purchasing from Copenhagen.
During remarks in May announcing Washington’s
interest in re-establishing a diplomatic presence in
Greenland, Carla Sands, the U.S. ambassador in
Copenhagen, said the local hire’s role would be to “link
[the embassy] directly with communities throughout
Greenland”.
6.1 The U.S. Military’s Thule Base
Greenland is an integrated part of the North American defence
architecture. The U.S. military’s Thule Air Base83 – the northernmost
installation of the US military installations with its nuclear early warning system
– is as already described supra part of the U.S. polar strategy. 84 The Northwest
Passage along with the Western Greenlandic coasts is the shortest distance
between the U.S. and West Europe, and data from Greenland forms the basis
for forecasting weather conditions in the North Atlantic and Europe of vital
importance for shipping and air traffic across the North Atlantic. As described
supra, the competition between China and the U.S. on the infrastructure and
commercial development – and especially the U.S. military interests – in
Greenland have impacted the Danish investments in urban infrastructure.
6.2 Keeping China out of Greenland
The Chinese interest in investment in the Greenlandic airport project is
seen as a geopolitical challenge by the U.S. The Chinese activities and interests
in the financing of infrastructure and extraction of minerals in Greenland as an
important part of it Polar Silk Road project, and the Russian military activities
in the Arctic are some of the most important reasons for the third U.S. purchase
offer in August 2019. The natural offshore and onshore Greenlandic resources,
83

The Air Base was established in 1951 without the involvement of the Greenlandic
population.
84

Jørgen Taafholt and Jens Claus Hansen, Greenland: Security Perspectives, Arcus, at 15 (the
book is available at https://www.arcus.org/publications/2001/greenland-security-perspectives
visited on 29 November 2019).
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as well as the interest in keeping China out of Greenland are of importance for
the federal government in Washington.
In 2016, the U.S fear that Chinese would pose threat to the Thule
Airbase made Denmark block the sale of the former U.S. Army naval facility at
Grønnedal to China’s state-owned enterprises (SOE).85 In 2019, the U.S. was
worried by the security consequences of China’s initiatives and Washington
‘ordered’ Denmark to stop China’s possibility to take part in the construction of
new airports in Greenland.86 On 16 September 2018, the U.S. declared its
willingness to invest in Greenland's airport infrastructure. 87
China’s involvement in the Arctic started in the 1990s with its
icebreaker purchase.88 The Puisi A/S project that was developed in 1995 to
innovate and produce seal sausage and seal oil capsules for Chinese consumers
is one example of an initiative that the Inuit expected could provide more
favourable outcomes from seal hunting.89 The Chinese interests gradually
increased during the 2010s with significant investment from 2012. China’s
infrastructure projects and its dialogue with Russia on Arctic issues partly
explain its’ interests in having access to the shipping possibilities and economic
possibilities in the Arctic.90 Chinese companies are also interested in
engineering projects in the harbours and other construction projects. 91 In the last
years China’s state-affiliated mining companies and investors have been
involved in projects related to mineral extraction activities in Greenland –

85

Concerning the SOE see Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, An Analysis of the State
Owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China, U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, 2011,
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/10_26_11_CapitalTradeSOEStudy.pdf
(visited on 3 December 2019).
86

Cécile Pelaudeix, Along the Road. China in the Arctic, BRIEF ISSUE, in European Union
Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), December 2018,
https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/along-road-–-china-arctic (visited on 3 December 2019.

87
Naalakkersuisut, Report on Foreign Affairs 2018, EM2018/14, journal number 2018-2195,
at 12-13.
88
Bjørner Sventrup-Thygeson, Wrenn Yennie Lindgren and Marc Lanteigne (eds.) China and
Nordic Diplomacy, Routledge, 2018, at 35.
89

Ulrik Pram Gad, Naja Dyrendom Graugaard, Anders Holgersen, Nina Lave and Nikoline
Schriver, Imagining China on Greenland’s Road to Independency, in the Arctic Yearbook
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including the uranium and rare earth extraction at Kvanefjeld.92 Chinese banks
were possible partners for the expansion of three airports in Greenland, and
China Communications Contracting Company (CCCC) took part in the bidding
process on new airports in Greenland in 2017. The Chinese state-owned
company withdrew its bid to build two of the international airports after
Greenland chose a Danish contractor.
In January 2018, China described itself as a ‘near-Arctic State’ in its
first white paper on its Arctic Policy.93 It unveiled its approach to expand its
influence globally with its trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative in the white
paper. It is stated that – as an important stakeholder in Arctic affairs – it is the
ambition to expand shipping routes and facilitate social-economic development
of the coastal states. It is the argument in the white paper that based on
international law – especially the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) – China has its legal rights in navigation, overflight, scientific
research, fishing and cable laying, and it has interest in exploration of minerals
and hydrocarbons.
7. Conclusions
Danish policy towards the Greenlanders has been criticized for ignoring
the cultural identity of the Inuit society as the integration of Greenland into the
Realm has been based on a priority to Danish language, a clear ethic hierarchy
to the Danes with no room for cultural plurality and structured around the
protection of the sovereignty over the Greenlandic territory. As a consequence
of this policy, a picture of the ideal national state based on respect for the Inuit
culture has increased in Greenland. As it has been described supra, the current
Greenlandic attitude is characterised by Greenlandic nationalism and a
reluctance against Denmark. The right of the Greenlandic people under the SelfGovernment Act to withdraw from the Danish Realm has not been used until
now, but the Greenlandic people do not want to continue the constitutional
integration of Greenland in the Danish Realm. It is also clear that it is not
possible for Denmark to sell Greenland as such a sale is in conflict with the
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United Nations Charter and the criteria established by the General Assembly for
decolonisation.
The current Greenlandic political strategy is not based on integration
into any existing national state. On the contrary, it is the full formal sovereignty
as a national state with the following three priorities: legal self-government,
economic self-sufficiency (independency from the block grant from Denmark)
and transition to a multi-faceted economy (as this reduces the vulnerability to
price fluctuations, for example, in fisheries products, and aboriginal cultural
identity). The answer to Trump’s interest in buying Greenland from
Naalakkersuisut on 16 August 2019 was clear:94
“We have a good cooperation with the USA, and we see
it as an expression of greater interests in investing in our
country and the possibilities we offer. Of course,
Greenland is not for sale.”
In its yearly Foreign Policy Strategy reports, the Naalakkersuisut is
stating that it is important for Greenland that the global interests in the Arctic
are converted into concrete agreements that it will make with different national
states – including the U.S. and China – as well as agreements with international
and regional organisations on cooperation. This explains why the global interest
in Greenland has already ensured foreign investment in the airport infrastructure
and in the private sector. Such investments as well as foreign workers are
needed to ensure a Greenlandic self-sustainable economy as the platform for a
national sovereign Arctic state.95 The Greenlandic ambitions in relation to the
U.S. it is explained in the Naalakkersuisut’ 2018 report on foreign affairs: 96
“In the long run, it is also hoped that cooperation with
the United States can be established in the future, which
is as broad and economically important for Greenland
as it is today with the EU.”
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In the report, the Naalakkersuisut is stressing that the signing in 2004 of the
Igaliku Agreement between the U.S., Denmark and Greenland has impacted
Greenland’s relation to – and its current direct cooperation with – the U.S.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/jculp/vol4/iss1/22

352

